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INTRODUCTION
PROESSOR Balkin contends that the principal problem posed for
fidelity is that of "constitutional evil."'  That is, how can the Con-
stitution deserve  our fidelity when it "is either unjust or permits  and
gives  legal sanction  to serious  injustices"-for  example,  the original
Constitution's support for the institution of slavery?2  Having thus di-
agnosed fidelity's main problem, Balkin argues that fidelity's principal
vice is its insidious "psychological  and sociological"  effect on the con-
stitutional faithful. 3  Specifically, Balkin believes that constitutional fi-
delity  forces  us  to  think  about  questions  of  justice  in  terms  of
confining constitutional  "concepts  and categories."4  Moreover, in or-
der to reduce  "cognitive  dissonance,"  fidelity induces  us  to suppress
recognition  of those  serious  injustices  that  plainly  are  beyond  the
Constitution's  reach.5
I believe that Balkin has misdiagnosed  the fundamental  problem of
constitutional fidelity, which is one of indeterminacy, not evil.  Indeed,
it is the relative indeterminacy  of the constitutional  text that largely
mitigates any problem of constitutional  evil; why interpret the Consti-
tution to  safeguard an evil practice  when  it is so  easy to construe  it
otherwise?  Balkin's diagnostic error, in turn, leads him to exaggerate
the deleterious psychological consequences  of constitutional fidelity in
an unjust world.  After  attempting  to  establish  these  points,  I  shall
briefly sketch  out what is for me  the principal  problem  of constitu-
tional fidelity-the nonexistence of any viable middle ground between
the deadhand  problem of originalist constitutional  interpretation  and
the judicial subjectivity problem of nonoriginalist  interpretation.
I.  THE PROBLEM  OF CONSTITUTIONAL  EVIL
Balkin rightly observes  that "[w]ithin  our legal culture  the idea  of
fidelity  to the  Constitution is  seen  as  pretty much  an  unquestioned
good."6  The problem for fidelity, according  to Balkin, is how to con-
front the possibility of constitutional evil-the  Constitution's respon-
*  Professor of Law, University  of Virginia.
1.  J.M. Balkdn, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham
L. Rev. 1703,  1706 (1997).
2.  Id.
3.  Id  at 1703.
4.  Id  at 1704.
5.  d
6.  Id
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sibility "for serious injustices."'7  One solution, which Balkin considers
but then  largely rejects,  is  "interpretive  conformation"-that  is, the
practice  of  "conforming  the  Constitution  to  our  ideas  of justice."8
Through this practice, we create for ourselves an "ideal Constitution,"
distinguishable from the "past interpretations of the Constitution and
past actions done in the name of the Constitution,"  and thus avoid the
problem  of constitutional  evil.9
Balkin  largely  rejects  this  approach  for  two  reasons.  First,  "the
Constitution  is not merely a document,"  but also a "cultural  and polit-
ical tradition"  with  "doctrinal  glosses";  we cannot  escape  this  tradi-
tion,  which  "weighs  on  us,  even  if  we  do  not  feel  its  weight."'1 0
Second, the Constitution's  "abstract ideas,"  such as liberty and equal-
ity, are  "historically  embedded"  concepts, which have  had "ideologi-
cal"  and  "legitimating"  functions;  ignoring  that  aspect  of  the
Constitution  is "hiding  one's head in the sand.""  For these two rea-
sons, Balkin believes that "interpretive conformation" at best can only
partially solve the problem of constitutional  evil.
I believe that Balkin significantly understates the malleability of the
Constitution.  American constitutional history reveals an almost limit-
less creativity among lawyers  and statesmen in construing the Consti-
tution  to  serve their  particularistic  purposes,  thus  enabling  them  to
avoid confrontation  with the problem  of constitutional  evil.  The his-
torical example that drives Balkin's paper-slavery-is  quite unrepre-
sentative in this regard.  The Constitution is a model of clarity on the
slavery question, at least in comparison  with most controverted issues
in American  constitutional  history.  Several constitutional  provisions
plainly secure the institution of slavery, 2 and no reasonable  observer
at the time  of the Founding would have  believed  that Congress  pos-
sessed a delegated power to interfere with slavery in existing states. 13
Thus,  it is  unsurprising  that most northern  opponents  of slavery  did
not  feel  free  to  question  the  institution's  constitutional  status.'4
Drawing general lessons about the Constitution's relative determinacy
7.  Id at  1706.
8.  Id  at  1704.
9.  Id at 1709.
10.  Id  at 1711-12.
11.  Id  at 1712-14.
12.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("three-fifths"  clause for apportioning the House of
Representatives);  id  at art. I, § 9, cl.  1 (temporary ban on congressional  interference
with the foreign slave  trade); id  at art. IV, § 2,  cl. 3 ("fugitive  slave clause").
13.  See James  Oakes,  "The  Compromising Expedient":  Justifying a Proslavery
Constitution, 17  Cardozo  L. Rev.  2023,  2025  (1996)  (James  Madison);  id. at  2035
(Charles  Pinckney); id. at 2045  (Tench Coxe).
14.  First  Inaugural Address, in 2 Abraham  Lincoln:  Speeches  and Writings  215,
215-16 (Don E. Fehrenbacher  ed.,  1989);  Republican Party Platform of 1860 § 4, re-
printed in National Party Platforms  1840-1972,  at 31, 32 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk
H. Porter  eds.,  5th  ed.  1973);  see Don E. Fehrenbacher,  The  Dred Scott Case:  Its
Significance  in  American  Law  and  Politics  548  (1978)  [hereinafter  Fehrenbacher,
Dred Scott]; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis  1848-1861, at 423, 532, 550 (1976).
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from its slavery provisions is risky business, though, as a quick canvass
of constitutional  history reveals.
Although  the  antebellum  Constitution  was  understood  plainly  to
protect  slavery  in  existing  states  from  congressional  interference,
there was no similar consensus  on the Constitution's ramifications for
congressional  power  over  slavery  in  the federal territories. By  the
1850s,  all of the dominant policy positions on this question  had been
converted  into  constitutional  interpretations.  Most  southerners  be-
lieved that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause protected slav-
ery  in  the  territories  from  congressional  interference  (John  C.
Calhoun's  "common  property"  doctrine).  Republicans  argued  that
the  very same Due Process  Clause  required  Congress to bar slavery
from  the territories,  because  slavery  was  a  denial  of  "liberty"  (the
"free soil"  position).  Northern Democrats  argued that Congress  was
barred from  resolving the  slavery-in-the-territories  issue  one way or
the other because  of the limited scope of its Article IV power to gov-
ern the territories (Stephen  A. Douglas's "popular sovereignty"  posi-
tion).  Apparently, the only constitutional position without significant
support  by the  1850s was  the one most plausibly attributable  to the
Constitution's framers-that Congress had the power, but not the ob-
ligation, to forbid slavery in the federal  territories.  So much for con-
stitutional  determinacy!'5
One can illustrate this point about constitutional malleability with a
seemingly infinite variety of examples.  Southerners by 1860 generally
believed  that  secession  was  a  constitutional  right;  virtually  all
northerners  disagreed.16  The  Constitution  has  been  interpreted  at
times to bar wealth redistribution; other times it has been construed to
permit or even (qualifiedly)  to require the same."  At times the Con-
stitution has permitted de jure racial segregation;  more recently it has
not.'  Poll taxes used to be perfectly constitutional-not any longer. 9
The Equal Protection Clause was interpreted for most of its history to
deny  equality  claims  based  on  sex  or  sexual  orientation;  this  has
15.  For the doctrines  discussed  in this paragraph, see Fehrenbacher,  Dred Scott,
supra  note 14, 152-87; Robert R. Russel, Constitutional Doctrines  with Regard to Slav-
ery in Territories,  32 J.S. Hist. 466  (1966).
16.  See Jesse T. Carpenter, The South as a Conscious Minority,  1789-1861, at 200-
13  (1930);  Potter, supra note 14, at 479-84.
17.  See, eg., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)  (approving wealth
redistribution as a "public purpose"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)  (re-
quiring the state to pay for defense  counsel of indigents in all  felony cases); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S.  1 (1915)  (denying the constitutional permissibility of state redis-
tributive ends).
18.  Compare Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)  with Plessy  v. Fergu-
son,  163 U.S. 537  (1896).
19.  Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383  U.S. 663 (1966)  with Breed-
love v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277  (1937).
1997) 1741FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
changed dramatically in recent years.2 0  Not that long ago, legislative
malapportionment  was deemed  to be a nonjusticiable  political ques-
tion; since the early 1960s, the Court not only has intervened, but has
applied  a  stringent  rule  of  one  person,  one  vote.2'  The  Justices
changed their minds within a twenty-year  period as to whether indi-
gent defendants  in noncapital  cases  were entitled  to state-appointed
counsel.2  It took less than a decade for the Court to change its mind
as  to  whether  a  compulsory  flag  salute  violated  the  First  Amend-
ment'  or whether a political party's racial restrictions on membership
violated the Equal  Protection  Clause.' 4  The meaning  of the  "com-
merce" power has been revolutionized in the twentieth century, with-
out  a  constitutional  amendment,2  as  have  the  meanings  of  the
Contract,26 Due Process,2 7 and Free  Speech Clauses.'
Many more  examples might be cited, but the point seems evident:
the principal  constraints  on constitutional interpretation  derive from
social  and political context, not from constitutional text or tradition.
Thus it is no mystery why few people are preoccupied with the prob-
lem of constitutional evil.  If the Constitution plausibly can be invoked
on either side of most contemporary public policy debates, why would
disputants create needless cognitive dissonance for themselves by con-
ceding the  existence of a gap between their constitutional interpreta-
tions and their views of social justice?  The real problem of fidelity is
not  constitutional  evil,  but  rather  constitutional  indeterminacy-a
point to which I shall return shortly.
Balkin understates  the malleability  of the Constitution  because  he
overstates the constraining force of constitutional tradition.  Balkin is
20.  Compare Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71  (1971)  (sex) with Bradwell v. Illinois,  83
U.S.  (16  Wall.)  130  (1873);  Romer  v. Evans,  116 S.  Ct. 1620  (1996)  (sexual orienta-
tion) with Bowers  v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.  186 (1986).
21.  Compare Reynolds  v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533  (1964)  and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186  (1962)  with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
22.  Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335  (1963)  with Betts v. Brady,  316
U.S. 455  (1942).
23.  Compare West  Virginia State  Bd. of Educ. v.  Barnette,  319 U.S.  624  (1943)
with Minersville  Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
24.  Compare Smith v.  Allwright,  321  U.S. 649  (1944)  with Grovey  v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45  (1935).
25.  Compare Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and United States v. Darby,
312 U.S.  100 (1941)  with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)  and Hammer
v. Dagenhart,  247 U.S.  251  (1918).
26.  Compare Home  Bldg.  & Loan Ass'n  v.  Blaisdell,  290  U.S.  398  (1934)  with
Sturges v.  Crowninshield,  17 U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  122 (1819).
27.  Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)  (economic sub-
stantive due process) with Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905);  Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporation of the Bill of Rights) with Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78  (1908); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)  (substantive due process
right to privacy) with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
28.  Compare, e.g.,  Brandenburg  v.  Ohio,  395  U.S. 444  (1969)  (per curiam)  with
Dennis  v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)  and Schenck  v. United States, 249 U.S.
47  (1919).
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right to note that constitutional  interpretation  is constrained; not any
interpretation is plausible at any particular point in time.  No court is
about to hold in 1997 that animal rights are protected under the Equal
Protection Clause.  Balkin, however, does not adequately consider the
possibility that the boundaries  on  plausible constitutional interpreta-
tion are set more by the social and political context than by constitu-
tional traditions.  Brown v. Board of Education 29  became a  plausible
interpretation of equal protection in  1954 because a  host of political,
economic, social, and ideological forces inaugurated  or accelerated  by
World War II were impelling the nation toward more egalitarian racial
norms.30  The interpretive constraints imposed by constitutional  tradi-
tion were burst asunder by these exigent extralegal forces.31  The wo-
men's  movement and the  gay rights  movement  likewise experienced
relatively  little  difficulty  surmounting  obstacles  posed  by  constitu-
tional  tradition  once  social  mores  had  shifted  sufficiently  in  their
direction.
32
Because social mores usually evolve incrementally, great departures
in constitutional tradition generally  are not required  to convert  posi-
tions  in contemporary  public policy  disputes  into plausible  constitu-
tional claims.  For example, as social mores grew increasingly  tolerant
of contraceptive  use in the post-World War II era, it became possible
for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut33 to constitutionalize  such a
right  on  a  limited  basis;  the  Court  relied,  inter alia, on  Skinner v.
Oklahoma,34  which  itself had reflected  changing  social  attitudes  to-
ward  procreation  rights.35  Then, as  the  burgeoning women's  move-
ment spawned increased public support for abortion access, the Court
in Roe  v.  Wade36  could  build upon  the  Griswold precedent  in  con-
29.  347 U.S. 483  (1954).
30.  See Michael J.  Klarman,  Brown,  Racial Chang  and the  Civil  Rights Move-
ment, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7, 13-71  (1994)  [hereinafter  Klarman,  Racial Change].
31.  I  do not deny that several  of the justices in Brown entertained  doubts about
jettisoning traditional constitutional concepts such as original intent and precedent; in
the end, though, those doubts were unanimously overcome. See Michael J. Klarman,
Civil Rights Law:  Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?,  83 Geo. LJ.  433, 436-
46  (1994).  But see Mark V. Tushnet, Making  Civil  Rights Law-  Thurgood Marshall
and the Supreme Court, 1936-1961,  at 187-95,  194 (1994)  (arguing that the justices in
Brown were simply "talking through their concerns about what they knew they were
going to do").
32.  See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996);  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
33.  381  U.S.  479 (1965).  Departures  from constitutional  tradition may  be more
easily accomplished  when  the Court's decision  simply  constitutionalizes  a dominant
national consensus  and deploys it against a local outlier.  Griswold certainly fits  this
description,  as  do many  of the  Court's celebrated  "countermajoritarian"  interven-
tions. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolu-
tions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 16-17  (1996).
34.  316 U.S. 535  (1942)  (invalidating an Oklahoma statute authorizing  the sterili-
zation of recidivist criminals).
35.  Griswold, 381 U.S.  at 485.
36.  410 U.S. 113  (1973).
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structing  a constitutional right to abortion. 3 7  As the gay rights move-
ment  gained  social  legitimacy  soon  thereafter,  those  Justices
sympathetic  to  the  cause  had  Roe  available  as  a  doctrinal  building
block for establishing  a substantive due process  right to private, con-
sensual,  adult sexual  relations.38  It  seems  unlikely  that  the  Court's
rejection of such  a right in Bowers v. Hardwick9  was more attributa-
ble  to the constraining  effect  of constitutional  tradition than  to the
conservative predispositions of a majority of Burger Court Justices sit-
uated within the social and political context of 1986.  With the passage
of an additional decade in which the gay rights movement was able to
broaden  and  deepen  support  for  its  cause,  constitutional  tradition
failed to inhibit the Court in Romer v. Evans 40  from ignoring Bowers
and protecting  gay rights  on the basis of some creative  doctrinal  ad-
justment.4'  Thus, while Balkin is  right that constitutional  interpreta-
tion is  constrained, he is wrong to locate the principal source  of that
constraint  in constitutional  "concepts  and categories"  rather than in
the contemporary social and political context.  What this means is that
constitutional  interpretation  with  regard  to  seriously  contested  con-
temporary  policy issues is  relatively unconstrained.
The crux of Balkin's  contribution  is his  analysis of the  deleterious
"psychological  and sociological"  consequences  of constitutional fidel-
ity in an unjust world.  He emphasizes two such effects.  First, fidelity
"requires us to speak  and think" in language of "constitutional  tradi-
tion and its characteristic concepts and categories,"42 thus creating "a
sort of tunnel vision"4 3 or "servitude""  by artificially constricting  the
ways in which we think about questions of social justice.  Second,  be-
cause  "fidelity  to  the  Constitution  cannot  be jettisoned,"" 5  and  be-
cause "[o]ur fidelity to the Constitution requires us to believe that it is
a basically good and just document, '46 we suppress any possible "cog-
nitive dissonance" by treating injustices not plausibly addressed by the
Constitution  as  "not  seriously  and  profoundly  great  injustices. ' 4 7
Although  both of these proffered consequences of fidelity are plausi-
ble, their significance  strikes me as marginal at best.  We already have
explored the reason why:  the Constitution's  malleability permits dis-
37.  Id. at 152-55.
38.  See  Bowers  v.  Hardwick,  478  U.S.  186,  199,  204-06  (1986)  (Blackmun,  J.,
dissenting).
39.  478 U.S. 186  (1986).
40.  116  S.  Ct. 1620  (1996).
41.  The doctrinal  creativity  of Romer is  deftly  explored  in  Louis  M.  Seidman,
Romer's Radicalism: The  Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism,  1996  Sup.
Ct. Rev.  (forthcoming  1997).
42.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1727.
43.  Id at 1726.
44.  Id
45.  Id at 1731.
46.  Id at 1729.
47.  Id  at 1732.
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putants on either side of most controverted  policy issues to invoke the
Constitution on their behalf.  This point requires  some elaboration.
Balkin is concerned that constitutional fidelity artificially constrains
our thinking about injustice by forcing us into "characteristic concepts
and  categories  ....  [when]  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  everything
worth  saying  about  justice  and  injustice  can  be  said  in  this  lan-
guage."48  But the many examples  of constitutional malleability noted
above  would seem  to  belie this  concern.  Our  constitutional  history
reveals that most challenges to widely-perceived  injustices  have been
rendered plausible, and often successful, under the Constitution.  It is
true that success often has come slowly.  Yet the relaxed  pace at which
constitutional interpretations  change is more plausibly attributable to
the incremental nature of social evolution than to the inhibitory effect
of traditional concepts  and categories  on constitutional  argument.49
Balkin offers just one concrete example to illustrate his point, and it
is  unpersuasive.  He criticizes  "the manner  in which  the  concept  of
equal protection  has been formalized  into  questions  of fundamental
right, suspect classification, substantial burden and tiers of scrutiny. '50
This formal doctrine, Balkin contends,  "forms  a procrustean  bed that
fails to do justice" and indeed "seems to be more a method of promot-
ing social inequality."'"  One might respond to Balkin by questioning
the extent to which equal  protection doctrine  really has  constrained
the  constitutional  decisionmaking  of  the  United  States  Supreme
Court.
For starters, it is noteworthy that the Court has extended equal pro-
tection  coverage  to  many  new  groups  in  the  last  quarter  century,
notwithstanding  strong  arguments  to the  contrary  grounded  in  "the
constitutional  tradition  and  its  characteristic  concepts  and  catego-
ries."52  Women,  aliens, nonmarital  children,  and homosexuals  have
come  to  enjoy  significant  constitutional  protection  as  social  mores
have changed and constitutional concepts have adjusted accordingly. 53
The  Equal  Protection  Clause  has  become  home  not  only  to  new
48.  Id.  at 1727.
49.  When  social mores change  quickly, as during  wartime, so does constitutional
interpretation. Compare, e.g., West Virginia  State Bd. of Educ.  v. Barnette,  319 U.S.
624,638 (1943)  (flag salute) with  Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)  (white primary) with Grovey v. Townsend, 295
U.S. 45 (1935).  When social mores change more  slowly, so does constitutional  inter-
pretation. Compare, e.g.,  Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)  (racial segre-
gation) with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71  (1971)
(sex discrimination) with Bradwell v. Illinois,  83 U.S. (16  Wall.) 130  (1873).
50.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1728.
51.  Id. For a similar sort of claim, see San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411  U.S. 1, 98-110  (1973)  (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1727.
53.  E.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S.  Ct. 1620 (1996)  (homosexuals); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259 (1978) (nonmarital children);  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.  190 (1976)  (women);
Graham v.  Richardson,  403 U.S. 365  (1971)  (aliens).
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groups  but also to new rights during this period.  With scarcely a def-
erential nod toward constitutional tradition, the Court has interpreted
the Equal Protection Clause to guarantee access to the criminal justice
system, the  franchise,  the right  to travel,  and more.54  Furthermore,
even during an era in which the Court rhetorically invokes the doctri-
nal structure Balkin laments, numerous cases evince the Justices'  will-
ingness to elide the doctrine when it prescribes results in tension with
their visceral  sense  of fairness.  The results  in  United States Depart-
ment  of  Agriculture  v.  Moreno, 55  Cleburne  v.  Cleburne  Living
Center, 56 Plyler v. Doe,57 and Romer suggest that  the  Justices'  intu-
itions about fairness drive constitutional decisionmaking more than do
characteristic concepts and categories. 5 8  To be sure, the Court, invok-
ing traditional  doctrinal concepts, sometimes rejects  equal protection
claims that seem meritorious to many observers.59  Yet it is difficult  to
know whether  such  results  indeed  are  attributable,  as Balkin  would
have it, to the stultifying effect of traditional doctrine, or rather to the
more conservative  (Burger) Court's lack of sympathy for the underly-
ing equality claim or its greater commitment to the principle of legisla-
tive deference.
Balkin  identifies  a  second  harmful  psychological  consequence  of
constitutional  fidelity in an unjust world.  This  is the pressure people
feel to regard injustices not plausibly addressed by the Constitution as
relatively  insignificant,  in  order  to  reduce  the  cognitive  dissonance
that would result from acknowledging  that we show fidelity to a docu-
ment that is not "basically good and just. '6 0  Here, again, the plausibil-
ity of Balkin's  claim  depends on his  premise that the  Constitution is
not sufficiently malleable to bear interpretations responsive to (virtu-
54.  E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618  (1969)  (travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections,  383  U.S.  663  (1966)  (franchise);  Griffin  v. Illinois,  351  U.S.  12  (1956)
(criminal process).
55.  413 U.S. 528  (1973).
56.  473 U.S. 432 (1985).
57.  457 U.S. 202 (1982).
58.  See Romer  v. Evans,  116  S.  Ct. 1620,  1629  (1996)  (invalidating  a Colorado
constitutional  amendment  that barred  state and  local  political  processes  from  ex-
tending any "protected status"  based on sexual orientation); Cleburne,  473 U.S. at 450
(invalidating  a zoning ordinance that required special  use permits for construction  of
a group home for the mentally disabled); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (invalidating a Texas
policy denying free public education to children of illegal aliens); Moreno, 413 U.S. at
538 (invalidating  a provision of the federal  food stamp program excluding from par-
ticipation households  containing unrelated individuals).
59.  E.g.,  Massachusetts  Bd.  of Retirement  v.  Murgia,  427  U.S.  307  (1976)  (re-
jecting an equal protection  challenge to age  discrimination on the ground  that age is
not a suspect classification);  San Antonio  Indep. Sch. Dist. v.  Rodriguez, 411  U.S. 1
(1973)  (rejecting a constitutional  challenge to unequal funding of school  districts  on
the ground that wealth is not a suspect classification and education is not a fundamen-
tal right).
60.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1729.  Mike Seidman has made a similar sort of claim
about two of the Court's most famous constitutional decisions. See Louis M. Seidman,
Brown and Miranda, 80  Cal. L. Rev. 673  (1992).
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ally) all evils perceived as such by a substantial portion of the popula-
tion.  Yet it seems likely that the reason the Constitution  inspires the
"idolatry"61  which  Balkin  warns  against  is  because  it  represents  all
things to all  people.  The Constitution's  meaning  is sufficiently  inde-
terminate that both the North and the South claimed the fundamental
charter on their side during the Civil War;'  little had changed a hun-
dred years later as  the Justices  confronted  the School Desegregation
Cases.63  Likewise, does the Constitution bar wealth redistribution, or
permit it, or perhaps  even require it?  The Court has ruled differently
at  different  times,'  and  even  today  leading  commentators  cannot
agree.6"  It would appear that the examples of constitutional indeter-
minacy noted above render Balkin's  claim suspect.  The examples  he
himself invokes  suggest that he plainly is wrong.
Balkin's principal  example  of this  "legitimation"  phenomenon  in-
volves contemporary attitudes  toward the problem of poverty.'  One
important  reason  people  today  seem  less  worried  than  previously
about the poor, Balkin argues,  is their  perception  that the  Constitu-
tion has nothing to say on the subject.  In order to reduce  the cogni-
tive  dissonance  that  would  flow  from  acknowledging  that  the
Constitution tolerates fundamental  evil, Balkin contends, people face
psychological  pressure to regard poverty as  only a minor injustice.  I
think Balkin's account must be mistaken for two reasons.
First, for most of this nation's first  two centuries,  the  Constitution
was understood to bar some forms  of wealth redistribution67 and not
to require any.68  Yet in the 1960s, America briefly became committed
61.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1730.
62.  See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom:  The Civil War Era 239-40,
246-47  (1988).
63.  Southerners after Brown reaffirmed  their "reliance  on the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land," while denouncing the Court's decision as a "clear abuse
of judicial power" because the Constitution consistently had been interpreted to per-
mit racial segregation. See  102 Cong. Rec. 4515-16  (1956)  (Southern Manifesto).
64.  See supra note  17.
65.  Compare Frank I. Michelman,  The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Forward: On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83  Harv. L Rev.  7 (1969)
with Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,
1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 695 and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality,  and the
Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup.  Ct. Rev. 41.
66.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1732-33.  For a similar sort of argument,  see Charles
W. McCurdy,  The  "Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law, in  Freedom  of
Contract  and the State (Harry N. Scheiber ed., forthcoming  1998).
67.  E.g., Coppage  v.  Kansas, 236  U.S.  1 (1915)  (invalidating  a statutory  ban on
yellow dog contracts and declaring that the state cannot have wealth redistribution as
its  objective);  Pollock  v.  Farmers'  Loan & Trust Co.,  158  U.S. 601  (1895)  (striking
down a national income tax as a direct, unapportioned tax); Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  122  (1819)  (invalidating  a debtor  relief law  under the contract
clause).
68.  Among the first instances in which the Supreme Court interpreted the Consti-
tution to require the state to subsidize the poor were Powell  v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932),  holding  that a state  must  provide  counsel  to indigent  defendants  in capital
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to a war on poverty, and the Supreme  Court, also briefly, was drawn
along in its wake.69  How could the nation have come to perceive the
maldistribution of wealth  as  a  great  evil if, for nearly two centuries,
the Constitution was understood either to permit or to require it?  In
Balkin's  view,  the need  to reduce  cognitive  dissonance  should  have
impelled  Americans  to regard  wealth inequality  as  a  trivial problem
rather than  a grave injustice.
Second, it is unclear why Balkin believes that mandatory wealth re-
distribution would be an  "off-the-wall" 7 0  constitutional  argument  to-
day.  It  is  vital  to Balkin's  claim  that it  be  so, for  otherwise  people
would face  no psychological  pressure to downplay the significance  of
poverty; cognitive dissonance, Balkin explains, flows only from the be-
lief that  the Constitution cannot plausibly be interpreted  to  reach  a
grave  injustice.  By  the  late  1960s,  however, the  Supreme  Court  al-
ready  had mandated mild forms  of wealth  redistribution  and, in the
view  of many  observers,  was  on  the verge  of requiring  a  good  deal
more.71  The  Justices  had intimated  the  existence  of a  constitutional
right to welfare,72 suggested that wealth, like race, was a suspect  clas-
sification,73 and constitutionally required the state in a few contexts to
subsidize  the  constitutional  rights  of  the  indigent.74  Lower  federal
courts,  urged  on  by  numerous  constitutional  commentators,75  had
pushed even farther in this direction, declaring the existence of consti-
cases, and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),  holding that a state must provide free
trial  transcripts,  or a reasonable  alternative,  to criminal  defendants  appealing  their
convictions.
69.  E.g., Shapiro  v. Thompson, 394  U.S. 618  (1969)  (invalidating durational  resi-
dency  requirements for welfare);  Harper  v. Virginia  Bd.  of Elections,  383 U.S.  663
(1966)  (invalidating  poll tax requirement  for voting  in state elections).
70.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1729.
71.  See, e.g., Winter, supra  note 65, at 42 (asserting that by 1969 the "champions of
judicial activism had gathered their forces  for a constitutional assault on the distribu-
tion of income"); see also Martin Shapiro, Fathers  and Sons:  The Court,  the Commen-
tators and the Search for Values, in The Burger Court:  The Counter-Revolution  That
Wasn't  218,  219 (Vincent  Blasi  ed.,  1983)  (suggesting  that a faction  of the  Warren
Court,  although not clearly a majority,  was moving  toward  constitutionalizing  mini-
mum levels  of subsistence, housing,  and education).
72.  Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
73.  McDonald  v. Board of Election  Comm'rs, 394  U.S.  802,  807  (1969)  (stating
that wealth and race are "two  factors which would independently render a  classifica-
tion highly suspect"); Harper,  383 U.S. at 668 ("Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property, like those  of race, are traditionally  disfavored."  (citations omitted)).
74.  Boddie  v.  Connecticut,  401  U.S.  371  (1971)  (access  fees  for divorce  court);
Harper,  383  U.S.  663  (poll taxes); Douglas v. California,  372 U.S. 353  (1963)  (state-
provided  counsel for indigent defendants'  appeals);  Gideon v. Wainwright,  372 U.S.
335  (1963)  (state-provided  counsel for  indigent defendants'  felony  trials);  Griffin  v.
Illinois,  351  U.S.  12  (1956)  (state-provided  trial transcripts  for indigent  defendants'
appeals).
75.  E.g., Harold W. Horowitz,  Unseparate  but Unequal-The  Emerging Fourteenth
Amendment  Issue  in  Public School  Education, 13  UCLA  L.  Rev.  1147  (1966);
Michelman,  supra note  65;  Lawrence  G.  Sager,  Tight Little Islands:  Exclusionary
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21  Stan. L. Rev. 767 (1969).
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tutional  rights  to  welfare  and  to  equal  educational  funding  across
school  districts. 6
Then  the Warren  Court came  to an  abrupt  end  in  1969  with  the
departures  of  Justice Fortas  and  Chief Justice  Warren.  The Burger
Court  immediately  and  decisively  halted  these  incipient  develop-
ments.77  For present purposes,  however, the key  points are  that the
constitutional  arguments  for  wealth  redistribution  were  succeeding,
that  they continued  to attract  significant  support  in  dissenting  opin-
ions by Warren Court holdovers,7 8  and that they easily could be resur-
rected once public opinion becomes more hospitable to the cause.  To
the  extent that constitutional  arguments for redistribution  seem  far-
fetched today, it is because of the changed social and political context,
not anything in the nature of the constitutional text or traditional con-
stitutional doctrine.  Would it not be odd if the Supreme Court discov-
ered  a  constitutional  right  to  welfare  just  as  Congress  begins
dismantling the modem welfare state?  Yet because constitutional ar-
guments for wealth redistribution  were taken seriously so recently, it
is  hard  to  see why  they should  be regarded  as  doctrinally  "off-the-
wall."  And  so  long  as  redistributive  arguments  are  constitutionally
plausible, acknowledging that poverty is a serious injustice creates  no
cognitive dissonance.
Balkin's  other  principal  example  confirms  that  his  legitimation
point is either marginal or simply wrong.  A general consensus existed
in  antebellum  politics  that the  Constitution insulated  slavery  in  the
existing states from congressional interference.7 9  Yet the fact that ab-
olition plainly was understood by mainstream  opinion to be  constitu-
tionally "out of bounds" did not induce most people to regard slavery
as only a minor injustice.  On the contrary, by the  1850s  slavery had
become  the  nation's  dominant  political  and  moral  issue,  with  most
northerners  committed to limiting the institution's  spread, while  con-
ceding that the Constitution prevented Congress from interfering with
slavery in the states where it already  existed.80  Lincoln, who consist-
76.  On welfare, see, e.g., Kaiser v. Montgomery, 319 F. Supp. 329 (N.D.  Cal. 1970)
(three-judge  court); Williams  v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450  (D. Md.  1968)  (three-
judge  court),  rev'd, 397  U.S.  471  (1970).  On  educational  funding,  see,  e.g.,  Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334  F. Supp. 870  (D.  Minn.  1971);  Rodriguez  v.  San  Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.  1971)  (three-judge court) (per curiam),
rev'd, 411  U.S.  1 (1973).
77.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411  U.S. 1, 54-55  (1973)  (rejecting
constitutional challenge to unequal funding of school districts); United States v. Kras,
409  U.S. 434,  443  (1973)  (rejecting  constitutional  challenge  to filing  fees for bank-
ruptcy court); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137,  141-43  (1971)  (denying that wealth is a
suspect classification);  Dandridge v. Williams,  397  U.S. 471, 484  (1970)  (denying  that
welfare  is a fundamental right).
78.  E.g., Rodriguez, 411  U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting);  Dandridge,  397 U.S.
at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79.  See supra notes 13-14.
80.  See McPherson, supra note 62,  at 117-69;  Potter, supra note  14.
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ently conceded that Congress  could not abolish  slavery in the states,
nonetheless  insisted that  "slavery is  an unqualified  evil."81  One can-
not  show  conclusively  that Balkin  is  mistaken  in his  belief that  the
need to reduce cognitive dissonance impels us to discount the gravity
of injustices  not plausibly redressable  by  the  Constitution.  But  cer-
tainly the course of antebellum politics on the slavery issue does noth-
ing to corroborate  his claim.8
Indeed if Balkin's legitimation point is of more than marginal signif-
icance, it is difficult to understand how any social movement challeng-
ing  the  political  and  constitutional  status  quo  succeeds.  If  ever  a
constitutional claim was "out of bounds,"  it was, until the last decade
or two, that of gays and lesbians  seeking anti-discrimination coverage
under the Equal Protection  Clause.  Yet the psychological  imperative
to reduce  cognitive dissonance by treating injustices not plausibly ad-
dressed  by the Constitution  as relatively  insignificant  apparently  has
not inhibited the creation of a robust gay rights movement.  Precisely
the same point applies  to the women's movement.  The fact that no-
body  in  the  early  twentieth  century  plausibly  could  claim  that  the
Constitution required women's suffrage did not inhibit the creation of
a  mass  public movement  demanding  that  reform.  Examples  easily
might be multiplied,  but the point  appears  evident.  Even  if there is
something to Balkin's legitimation point-and  I think there  is some-
thing to it-he surely overstates  its effect.  Fidelity's  most significant
vice is not its deleterious psychological  and sociological effects  on the
constitutional faithful.
Balkin's  principal  claim  apparently  locates  him  within  a  larger
school of thought that emphasizes  the  symbolic or educational  effect
of Supreme Court decisions.13  This body of scholarship tends to em-
phasize the  obverse  of Balkin's  position:  when the  Supreme  Court
holds that the Constitution does condemn  a particular practice, public
opinion  is  educated  in  a  positive  direction.  Most  notably,  conven-
tional  wisdom  holds  that Brown had  a  significant  influence  of  this
sort.'  Yet  the accuracy  of this  claim  regarding  the  educational  or
81.  E.g.,  Abraham  Lincoln,  Speech at Edwardsville,  Illinois,  in 1 Abraham  Lin-
coln:  Speeches  and Writings, supra note  14, at 580,  581-82;  see also Abraham  Lin-
coln's  Reply  in  the  Seventh  Lincoln-Douglas  Debate,  in  1  Abraham  Lincoln:
Speeches  and Writings, supra note  14, at 807-08  (observing that the great  difference
between Democrats and Republicans is that only the latter regard slavery as "a moral,
social and political wrong").
82.  In addition, to the extent that northerners  were prepared  to make concessions
regarding slavery, it probably was their fidelity to the Union rather than the need to
suppress cognitive dissonance that induced them to minimize the injustice of the insti-
tution. See, e.g.,  R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme  Court Justice Joseph Story:  Statesman
of the Old Republic  377-78  (1985).
83.  E.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court  an Educative Institution?,
67 N.Y.U.  L. Rev.  961  (1992).
84.  See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing
of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 Va. L. Rev. 151,  152-53 (1994);  C. Herman Pritch-
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symbolic  effect  of  Supreme  Court  decisions  is  as  contestable  as
Balkin's obverse contention.
First, it is not obvious that even Brown had a dramatic effect of this
sort.  Note that this causal claim is different from the one that Brown
inspired blacks to press their civil rights grievances  in court.  African-
Americans  fully  appreciated  the  injustice  of  Jim  Crow  without
Supreme  Court instruction; Brown simply made it clear that lawsuits
challenging segregation were now likely to be victorious.'  Rather the
claim about Brown's educational influence is principally one regarding
its effect on white opinion.  And here the historical record is far more
ambiguous  than  conventional  wisdom  would  have  it.  In the  South,
Brown, if anything,  crystallized  southern  resistance  to changing  the
racial status  quo.86  In the nation as a whole, opinion polls conducted
in the years after Brown registered only minor movement in attitudes
toward  racial  segregation-a  gradual  shift  in  opinion  that  plausibly
could  be  attributable  to  political,  social,  economic,  and  ideological
trends  inaugurated  or  accelerated  by World  War  II  as  much  as  to
Brown.87
There  is  little reason  to believe  that  Supreme  Court  decisions  in
politically controversial cases often have the sort of legitimizing effect
that Balkin implicitly,  and others  explicitly, ascribe  to them; indeed,
there is some reason to believe that Court decisions have precisely the
opposite effect.  Scott v. Sandford8  hardly convinced Republicans that
their party was,  as the Court had declared it to be, built upon an un-
constitutional  platform;  if anything,  the  decision  probably converted
at least  some additional  northerners  to the Republican  cause.89  To-
day's  conventional understanding  of Roe v.  Wade90  is  that, far from
reconciling abortion opponents to a woman's fundamental right to ter-
minate her pregnancy, the decision actually spawned a right-to-life op-
position  which  did  not  previously  exist.9  Fimaliy,  is  it  plausible  to
believe that any substantial number of gay and lesbian Americans  (or
other supporters of their rights) came to question the morality of their
ett, Equal Protection  and the Urban Majority, 58 Am. PoL Si. Rev. 869,  869  (1964);
Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 Va. L Rev. 173,
175-77 (1994).
85.  See Michael J. Klarman,  Brown  v.  Board  of Education:  Facts and Political
Correctness,  80 Va. L. Rev. 185,  187-89  (1994).
86.  See Klarman, Racial Change, supra note 30,  at 75-150.
87.  See id at 78.
88.  60 U.S.  (19  How.)  393  (1856).
89.  See Fehrenbacher, Dred Scott, supra note  14, at 561-67  (concluding  that the
combination  of Dred Scott and the  furor  raised  over  the Lecompton  Constitution
probably explains the momentous Republican gains in the lower North between 1856
and 1858, which  ultimately enabled Lincoln to win the presidency  in 1860).
90.  410 U.S. 113  (1973).
91.  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 354-59  (1994);  Gerald  N.
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:  Can Courts Bring About Social  Change?  188, 341-42
(1991);  Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial  Voice, 67 N.Y.U.  L Rev.  1185,
1205 (1992).
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sexual orientation  on the basis of Bowers?  On the contrary, I think it
probable that Bowers was one of the most important factors in mobil-
izing today's gay rights movement.
Whether  or not this  "backlash thesis" 92 is  correct, the  case for the
legitimizing effect of Supreme Court decisions (or, obversely, Balkin's
claim for the delegitimizing effect of Supreme Court nondecisions) has
not been established.  It is implausible  to believe that the nation's ap-
parent relative indifference to poverty in the 1990s is significantly at-
tributable to the Court's refusal to recognize  a  constitutional  right to
wealth redistribution  a quarter century  ago.
II.  THE  REAL PROBLEM  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  FIDELITY
The missing  variable  that  causes  Balkin to  overstate  the  harmful
psychological  consequences  of  fidelity  is,  it  turns  out,  also  the  real
problem  of fidelity:  the malleability of the constitutional text.  Consti-
tutional  evil is a minor problem because the  Constitution generally-
except  perhaps  with  regard  to  slavery-is  sufficiently  malleable  to
permit non-evil interpretations.  American  constitutional  history sug-
gests that almost any practice perceived  as unjust by a sufficient per-
centage of the population eventually  will be subjected to a (plausible)
constitutional challenge.  Yet herein lies  the real problem with consti-
tutional  fidelity.  If most controversial  social issues  plausibly  can  be
converted  into constitutional disputes,  and the document's  text is  in-
determinate as to how those disputes ought to be resolved, how do we
show fidelity to the  Constitution  without  subjecting  ourselves  to un-
cabined  judicial  rule?  Balkin's  paper  says  not  a  word  about  the
countermajoritarian  difficulty posed by judicial review;  yet this is  fi-
delity's principal problem-or at least half of it.  The other half is the
deadhand  problem  of constitutionalism.
The purest form of constitutional fidelity would appear to be some
version  of  originalism.  Yet  originalist  constitutional  interpretation
creates  an enormous deadhand  problem:  why should today's genera-
tion be governed by decisions made two hundred years ago by people
who inhabited a radically different world  and held radically different
ideas  and  values?  To  the  extent that  originalists  bother  to  defend
their interpretive methodology, they tend to offer a comparative justi-
fication:  originalism is superior to its most plausible alternative, which
is  some  form  of  relatively  uncabined  judicial  value  creation.93  In
other  words,  originalists  often  assert  that  it  is  antidemocratic  for
unelected,  remotely accountable  judges to invalidate  democratically-
92.  See Michael J. Klarman, How Brown  Changed Race Relations: The Backlash
Thesis, 81 J. Am. Hist.  81  (1994).
93.  See Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and  Impersonality of Originalism,  19 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 283,  288 (1996);  Jonathan  R. Macey,  Originalism as an "ism", 19
Harv.  J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 301,  306 (1996); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. Cin.  L. Rev. 849  (1989).
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enacted  legislation  on  the basis  of  their  own  subjective  value judg-
ments.94  One  might  retort,  however,  why  isn't  it  equally  an-
tidemocratic  for a  contemporary  majority  to be governed  by values
enshrined  in the Constitution  over two hundred  years  ago?  That is,
haven't constitutional originalists simply substituted a deadhand prob-
lem for a judicial subjectivity problem?95  Both interpretive methodol-
ogies are susceptible to the charge  of being antimajoritarian.
Most efforts  to locate a middle ground between the polar positions
of deadhand  rule and uncabined judicial  subjectivity have  embraced
some version  of a  "living  Constitution," 96  "moderate  originalism,"97
or "translation.198  However labeled, the idea is that one can avoid the
vices of both deadhand control and uncabined judicial subjectivity by
taking the Framers'  concepts and "translating" them into modern cir-
cumstances.  The obvious problem  wvith the enterprise  is one of inde-
terminacy-doesn't  translating  old  concepts  into  modern  contexts
inevitably implicate the very sort of unconstrained judicial subjectivity
that translation's  proponents seek to avoid?  I have  endeavored  else-
where to show that the answer is "yes"-the translation enterprise  is
quite hopeless.99  To briefly summarize, there are  a couple  of distinct
problems.
First, translation fails to accomplish  its objective of avoiding dead-
hand control.  When  we  translate  old constitutional  concepts  to ac-
commodate  new  circumstances,  the  deadhand  problem  persists,
because  it  is  always  possible  that  an  unconstrained  modern  deci-
sionmaker would simply conclude that the old concept has outlived its
usefulness.  Translators  ask, for example,  how the  Framers'  commit-
ment to federalism principles should be adjusted to reflect the reality
94.  See,  e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:  The Political  Seduction
of the Law 256-59  (1990).
95.  See, e.g., Michael  C. Dorf, A Nonoriginalist  Perspective on the Lessons of His-
tory, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub.  Pol'y 351,  353  (1996);  see also Lino  A. Graglia, It's Not
Constitutionalism, It's Judicial  Activism,  19 Harv. J.L  & Pub. Pol'y 293, 296  (1996)
(observing  that  constitutionalism  raises  a  deadhand  problem  and judicial  review  a
countermajoritarian  problem).
96.  E.g.,  William H.  Rehnquist,  The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54  Tex. L.
Rev. 693  (1976)  (criticizing  the concept).
97.  See Paul  Brest, The  Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,  60
B.U. L. Rev. 204, 205  (1980).
98.  E.g.,  Lawrence  Lessig,  Fidelity in  Translation, 71  Tex. L  Rev.  1165  (1993);
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding  Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 Stan.  L
Rev. 395  (1995)  [hereinafter  Lessig,  Understanding  Changed Readings].
Even conservative  originalists play this game when doing so is  politically  impera-
tive, though they like to  pretend  otherwise. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 94,  at 81-82
(seeking to justify Brown by elevating the level of generality at which the intention of
the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters is stated); Michael W. McConnell,  Originalism
and the Desegregation  Decisions, 81  Va. L. Rev.  947, 1103-04  (1995)  (same).
99.  See Michael  J. Klarman,  Anti-Fidelity, 70  S.  Cal. L  Rev.  (forthcoming  Mar.
1997)  [hereinafter Klarman, Anti-Fidelity]. For another affirmative answer, see Mark
V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A  Critique  of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles,  96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 798-804  (1983).
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of  a modem,  industrial, highly  integrated  economy. 00  Perhaps  the
right question to ask, however,  is whether  the Framers  would retain
their  commitment  to  federalism  at  all  in  light  of  these  radically
changed  circumstances.  After all,  at least some of the Founders em-
braced federalism  less  out  of political  principle than  political neces-
sity-that is,  the  fact that the  state legislatures,  which  could  not  be
entirely cut out of the Constitution's ratifying process, would be loath
to relinquish too much of their power.' 0'  This is not to deny that fed-
eralism retains many of its virtues even today.  For example, it fosters
experimentation,  encourages  competition  between  states,  arguably
maximizes preference  satisfaction  in a geographically  diverse nation,
enhances  citizen participation  in government, and  ensures the  exist-
ence  of  competing  governmental  power  sources: ° 0  Yet  federalism
also has many disadvantages,  some of which are simply the flip-sides
of its  advantages.  Federalism  permits races  to the bottom, prevents
realization  of efficiencies  of scale, frustrates efforts to create  an eco-
nomic common market, arguably creates greater opportunities for mi-
nority  oppression (the  converse of Madison's  point in Federalist  No.
10)  and  obstructs  implementation  of  federally-guaranteed  rights
(think of massive resistance to Brown). Plainly, balancing the compet-
ing virtues  and vices  of federalism  is a  complicated  enterprise.  My
only point here is that freed from the political reality that made feder-
alism commitments unavoidable, and apprised of the massive political,
social, and  economic  changes  that arguably  render federalism  obso-
lete,  it  is  entirely  plausible  that  the  transplanted  Founders  would
choose to reject federalism  altogether rather than translating it.
Nor  does translation  solve the problem  of uncabined judicial rule.
There  are two distinct problems.  First, when translating, how do we
know  which circumstances  to hold constant  and which  to vary-that
is, when asking what the Framers would have done under modern cir-
cumstances, which aspects of their world do we vary and which do we
leave  in  place?  Second,  assuming  we  can  answer  this  question  of
which changed  circumstances  are relevant to the translation, how  do
we  calculate  what the  Founders  would  have  done  in  light  of those
changes?
100.  E.g.,  Lawrence  Lessig,  Translating Federalism: United States  v. Lopez,  1995
Sup. Ct. Rev. 125; Lessig,  Understanding Changed Readings, supra note 98.
101.  See, e.g., Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings:  Politics and Ideas in the Making
of the Constitution 162, 169-70 (1996).  Madison had to sacrifice many of his national-
ist aspirations-the national veto on state laws, the open-ended grant of national leg-
islative power, the constitutional mandate of lower  federal courts-to accommodate
political reality.
102.  See,  e.g.,  Steven  G.  Calabresi,  "A  Government of Limited and Enumerated
Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 752, 774-84  (1995);
Larry  Kramer,  Understanding Federalism, 47  Vand.  L.  Rev.  1485,  1498-99  (1994);
Andrzej  Rapaczynski,  From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence  of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985  Sup. Ct. Rev.  341, 380-414.
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Consider  first the  question  of which changed  circumstances  to in-
corporate into  the translation.  A rather  large problem  immediately
presents itself:  If we treat all changed circumstances  as relevant vari-
ables, then  we simply  will have  converted  the Framers  into  us,  and
asking how they would resolve a problem is no different from  asking
how we would resolve  it.  Yet a decision to treat some changed  cir-
cumstances  as  variables  and others  as  constants  seems entirely arbi-
trary.  For  example,  it is wholly  uncontroversial  to vary the existing
state of technology when translating the congressional power to regu-
late interstate commerce.  I am aware of nobody who argues that Con-
gress  cannot regulate  airplanes  because  they did  not exist when the
Constitution was adopted;  airplanes  are a modem analogue of ships,
so certainly  Congress can regulate  their interstate movement.  Yet in
translating Congress's Commerce Clause power, why is it any less jus-
tifiable to treat as relevant variables all of the other changed circum-
stances  that might  influence  one's  attitude  toward  federalism-for
example, the modem proliferation of national and international mar-
kets, the transportation and communications revolutions, the nation's
growing  international  role,  the  increased  mobility  of  the  American
population, and so forth?
Even if we could  agree on which  changed circumstances  are  rele-
vant,  we  still  would  need  to  figure  out  whether  the  extent  of the
change has been sufficient to justify a translation.  For example, Law-
rence  Lessig has  argued that by the  1930s  changed  circumstances-
both conceptions  of the nature  of law and political  and social  vari-
ables, the most notable of which was the Great Depression-justified
the Supreme Court's repudiation of the Lochner era's commitment to
laissez-faire  economics  and  limited  national  government  power."' 3
Lessig's empirical claim about changed circumstances  seems  convinc-
ing.  The pathologies of a complex urban, industrial society plainly did
reduce  the  allure  of  laissez-faire  and  increase  support  for  national
government  regulation  by  the  1930s.  Yet  a court  charged  with  the
complex  task  of  translating  the Framers'  intentions  needs  to  know
more than the general direction of changing circumstances; it needs to
identify with precision the point at which those changes have become
sufficient to justify a translation.  The problem is that at any particular
point  in  time,  reasonable  people  will  disagree  about  whether  the
change in circumstances  has been sufficient to justify a translation of
the Framers'  intentions.  As late as 1937, the Four Horsemen still had
not spotted sufficient changes in circumstance to justify translation of
laissez-faire  and federalism concepts.10 4  On the other hand, as early
as  1905-1910  some justices  and scholars  already had identified  suffi-
103.  Lessig,  Understanding Changed  Readings, supra  note 98,  at 443-70.
104. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76 (1937)  (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting);  West  Coast  Hotel v.  Parrish,  300  U.S.  379, 400  (1937)  (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
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cient change to warrant a translation.1 0 5  Furthermore, it is difficult to
believe  that one's  view  of the  sufficiency  of  changed  circumstances
does  not  reflect,  to  a  substantial  degree,  one's  normative  commit-
ments.  The Four Horsemen,  for example,  would  have  been  uncon-
vinced  of the  sufficiency  of  changed  circumstances  in  1937  largely
because they liked things better the old way.1 06  Measuring the extent
of changed circumstances  and assessing whether they are sufficient to
justify a translation are tasks certain to yield controverted conclusions.
One can phrase this in terms of translation-would  the Framers have
considered  the  changed  circumstances  sufficient  to  justify  altering
their constitutional  commitments?  Since the answer to that question,
however, is so obviously indeterminate, it appears that the real ground
of controversy is over what we think should be done, rather than over
what  the  Framers  would  have  done  in our  changed  circumstances.
Translation  solves  the judicial  subjectivity problem  no better than it
does the deadhand  problem.
CONCLUSION
The real  difficulty with fidelity is not that of constitutional  evil;  the
relative malleability  of the Constitution  largely eliminates  that prob-
lem.  Rather, the quandary for fidelity is how one can remain faithful
to the Constitution without succumbing  to either of the twin patholo-
gies of deadhand  rule or judicial  rule, neither  of which  seems like a
particularly  attractive way  to run  a  democracy.  It  is  easy to under-
stand the urge to seek a middle ground between these polar patholo-
gies.  Yet it turns  out that the search is hopeless.  Translation does not
work;  it eliminates  neither the deadhand problem nor that of judicial
subjectivity.  The  problem  of  constitutional  fidelity  is  irresolvable.
Perhaps  we should reconsider our  premises.  Is it clear that constitu-
tional fidelity really is such  a good thing?'01 7  Perhaps we should give
"constitutional  adulter[y]' '108 a try.
105.  E.g.,  Lochner v.  New  York,  198  U.S.  45,  75  (1905)  (Holmes, J.,  dissenting)
("This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does
not entertain.");  Learned Hand, Due Process and the Eight-Hour  Day, 21  Harv. L.
Rev. 495, 506-07  (1908)  (noting changed conceptions  of property and contract  rights
that allow for greater  social regulation);  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale
Li. 454, 464 (1909)  (criticizing substantive due process decisions as relying  on a for-
malistic conception  of law that  "contrast[s]  with  the  social  conception  of the pres-
ent");  id.  at  467  (noting  "new  conditions  in  business  and  industry"  of  which
legislatures should be able to take account  in regulatory  legislation).
106.  They also may have considered  changed circumstances  irrelevant to constitu-
tional interpretation. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 44849
(1934)  (Sutherland,  J.,  dissenting)  ("A provision  of the  Constitution...  does  not
mean one thing  at one time and an entirely different  thing at another time.").
107.  I  have argued  against constitutional  fidelity  in Klarman, Anti-Fidelity, supra
note  99,  and  explored  non-constitutional,  majoritarian  uses  of judicial  review  in
Michael  J. Klarman,  Majoritarian  Judicial Review:  The Entrenchment Problem, 85
Geo. LJ.  (forthcoming Feb.  1997).
108.  Balkin, supra note 1, at 1703.
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